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My name is Lisa Brown and I am the general counsel
for the National Abortion Federation (NAF). NAF is
the professional association of abortion providers in
the United States and Canada. Our members include
clinics, doctor's offices, and hospitals who together
care for more than half of the women who chose to
have an abortion each year. The mission of NAF is
to ensure safe, legal, and accessible abortion care to
promote health and justice for women.
I am here today to talk about Medicaid and abortion
care. I am going to begin my presentation with an
overview of some statistics about the women who
choose abortion in the United States and then talk a
bit about the Medicaid system itself. I will conclude
with an analysis of how the treatment of abortion care
by Medicaid disproportionately impacts low income
women and creates disparities in the ability of these
women to exercise their choice of abortion when faced
with an unintended pregnancy.
Despite the fact that abortion is a controversial
political topic, it is also one of the safest and most
common medical procedures provided in the United
States. Nearly half of all pregnancies in the U.S. are
unintended and four in ten of those pregnancies will
end in abortion. This neans that by age forty-five,
almost one-third of American women will have had
an abortion. In terms of numbers per year, in 2005
there were 1.21 million abortions provided in the
United States. Ihis is a common procedure that many
American women will experience in their lives.
When in their pregnancies do women have abortions?
Almost ninety percent of abortions are performed
in the first trimester of pregnancy, which is the first
twelve weeks after the first day of the last menstrual
period. What are some of the general characteristics
of women having abortions? The majority of women
having abortions are in their twenties. Most abortions
are obtained by those who have never married. Married
women account for a lower proportion of abortions
in part because they have low rates of unintended
pregnancy. Ihose who do experience an unintended
pregnancy are more likely than unmarried women to
continue that pregnancy.
The largest racial ethnic identification of women having
abortions is non-Hispanic white. However black and
Ilispanic women together make up more than half of
women having abortions. This proportion is greater
than their proportion in the population partly because
they have a higher rate of unintended pregnancy.
Forty-three percent of women identify themselves as
Protestant. The proportion of abortion patients who are
Catholic is slightly lower than the Catholic proportion
of the entire population. Thirteen percent of abortion
patients say they are Born Again or Evangelical
Christians. lxenty-two percent of abortion patients
claim no religious identification. That is compared with
only about sixteen percent of the general population
that claims no religious identification.
Ihe need for abortion spans the economic spectrum.
lowever, low income women are over-represented
among abortion patients. Some fifty-seven percent of
women having abortions in 2000 were poor or low
income, which
means tlhey wvee
living at less
than txwice the
poxverty lexel.
To put this into
context, txxentyx
sexven percent
of xwomen xwere
lixving belows
100 percent
of the Federal
Poxverty L exel,
xwhich means
they earned approximately $900 a month to suppoit an
indlividiial or $1,500 a month for a family of three. Only
txwentxy-fixve percent of wvomen reported lixving more
than 300 peircent aboxve the Federal Poxvertx Lexvel,
xvhieh is still not a lot of income. A family of three
xxould be earnino approximately $4,500 per month.
In addition to being disproportionately low income, many women face
significant barriers to obtaining abortion care. Eighty-seven percent ot U.S.
counties had no abortion provider in 2005, a number that has increased
steadily since the 1970s. In non-metropolitan areas, ninety-seven percent of
counties had no provider. As a result, many women must travel substantial
distances to access this service. The Guttmacher Institute has found that
about one in four wonen who have an abortion travel fifty miles or more
for the procedure, a significant distance and a documented barrier to timely
care.
Over the past several years, the abortion rate in the United States has
declined. The rate of unintended pregnancy has remained generally the
same across the whole population. Notably, however, the rate of unintended
pregnancy has increased by txwenty-nine percent among women living
below the poverty level and sixteen percent of womcn who are poor
account for thirty percent of unintended pregnancies.
Because a disproportionate number of low income women will experience
an unintended pregnancy, they are also a population that is greatly affected
by access to abortion services. Funding from state and federal Medicaid
programs influence what choices are available for low income women
seeking abortion care. Low income women disproportionately rely on the
Medicaid system. Medicaid is the nation's state/federal health coverage
program for the poor. It provides over txxwenty million low income women
with basic health and long term care coverage. Eligibility for Medicaid
is based on meeting federal income and categorical requirements. Under
Medicaid, states receive federal matching funds to provide healthcare for
low income individuals. In order to receive these funds, states must provide
a certain core set of services to specific groups and individuals.
Over two-thirds of adults on Medicaid are women. Women are more
likely to have lower incomes and to meet the eligibility criteria for
Medicaid. Women are also more likely than the general population to be
of reproductive age, poor, nnorities, less educated, and parents. Nearly
txxo-thirds of adult women on Medicaid are in their reproductive years and
rely on Medicaid coverage for family planning and pregnancy related care.
State Medicaid programs must cover pregnant women with incomes up
to 133% of the Federal Poverty Level - this is approximately $1,200 a
month for one person - during pregnancy and up to sixty days postpartum.
States may elect to cover women with incomes that are higher than those
in the guidelines, and can receive federal matching funds for coverage of
pregnant women with incomes up to 185% of the Federal Poverty Level.
States base a wimde variety ot coveiage limits from 13 3%~ of tbe IFederal
Poveity L evel in some states to 275% in Minnesota. To put this in contextL
that is not a lot of money. For a famils of thiee under the 2009 F ederal
Poxvertx Guidelines, 133% is $2,029 per month or a total incomc of $24,350
per y ear for the entire family.
IUless medically necessary services are specifically excluded or deemed
optional by the Federal (iovernment, states participating in the Medicaid
piogram aie mandated to reimbuise Medicaid enrolled health care
protessionals for pioviding those services. Unfortunately, abortion has
become one ol the most ostraciz'ed medical procedures in the Medicaid
system. Between the Roe v WT-Kade decision in 1973 and 1976, Medicaid
paid for abortions without any express restrictions. In 1976, Representative
Henry Hyde introduced an amendment to linit federal funding of abortion
services. Ie Hilyde Amendment, which is reapproved by Congress each
year, allows federal funding for abortions only in cases of rape, incest, or
life endangerment. This restriction was challenged in court and in 1980 the
U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Narris v 1cRae that the lyde Amendment's
prohibitions on abortion, including those on medically necessary abortion
care, were constitutional.
The Court also upheld the right of a state participating in the Medicaid
program to fund only those abortions for which it received federal funding
rather than all medically necessary abortions. Justice Marshall strongly
dissented on the basis that denying medically necessary care to poor women
is equivalent to denying them access to legal abortion altogether. lowever,
several state challenges have proven successful. Although there are still
restrictions, several state constitutions provide greater protection than the
federal constitution does. Lawsuits requiring Medicaid coverage using
state funds for abortions in all or most medically necessary circumstances
have been successful in thirteen states. Despite these lawsuits, the effect of
the Hyde Amendment on low income women has been drastic. In thirty-
three states and the District of Columbia, Medicaid only provides funding
for abortions in cases of rape, incest, or life endangerment.
A low income woman seeking an abortion for other reasons, even those
related to her health, is left with few options. Often women are forced to
sell their possessions or use money set aside for rent or groceries to pay
for an abortion. Six in ten low income women report wanting to have their
abortion earlier. Without public funding. abortion is essentially not an
option for many women. Studies have shown that eighteen to thirty-five
percent of women who would have had an abortion carried their pregnancy
to term in absence of funding. Across the country, private funders assist
thousands of Medicaid enrolled or Medicaid eligible women with raising
the money for abortion care each year.
The Hyde Amendment and restrictions on Medicaid funding also have a
broad impact on abortion providers who find it difficult to find the funds
to provide care for low income women and often charge on a sliding scale
for those who should be covered by Medicaid. In states where Medicaid
does cover all or most medically necessary abortions using state Medicaid
dollars providers report a series of administrative barriers to receiving
reimbursements, even for filing reimbursements with the Medicaid
program. Providers report they often have to jump through many hoops
and fill out extra paperwork for abortion procedures or face having their
reimbursements routinely denied or held for up to a year when they legally
should be cov eied. WXomen report being told by their Medicaid ottice that
Medicaid wvould nev er coxver abortion exven in states wxheic Medicaid is
icquiicd to fund it in all oi most health circumstances. This campaign of
administrativ e barrieirs and disinformation adds to thc confiusion that the
Medicaid sy stem causes and the burdcn that thcse rcstrictions place on Ion
income xxomen.
In closing. Justice Brennan stated in his dissenting opinion in Harris v
AcRae. that the H y de Amendment is ai attempt to "impose the political
majoritys j 1udgmcnf" on a xxoman making a reproductiv e choice that the
government disfavors. The Hyde Amendment "imposes that viewpoint
only upon that segment of our society which, because of its position of
political powerlessness, is least able to defend its privacy rights." Haris v
McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). NAF remains committed to ensuring that low
income women have equal access to abortion services, regardless of their
ability to pay or the Medicaid system in their state. Activists are working
together across the country to raise awareness of the Hyde Xmendment and
its effect on low income women and NAF is a member of a broad campaign
to educate members of Congress and the Administration about the harmful
effects of the Hyde Amendment. To achieve reproductive equally for all
women and ensure that each woman has the ability to make the choice that
is right for her, restrictive barriers such as the Hyde Amendment must be
abolished.
Dr. William Parker*:
I am going to continue with the theme of discussing the notion of choice,
which or me is kind of a bad word. I think it is a notion that is antiquated
when you look at the context in which most women make the decision of
whether to continue their pregnancy.
I have laced the words together a little bit differently: abortion care,
Medicaid, and disparity. Lisa laid out the fact that Medicaid is the system
of social insurance for most people who meet the means test of being in
poverty. It certainly describes poor women and women of color, but the two
are not always the same. What I would like to do is try to connect some of
the dots for you and review a few of the things she said, and maybe create
a ditterent context around them, particularly as they pertain to race and
ethnicity. I will then talk specifically about how my practice as an abortion
care provider has been impacted by the reality of Medicaid and the Hyde
Amendment.
To very briefly summarize what Lisa said, about six million pregnancies
happen annually, and about half of those are unintended. Ilowever,
unintended does not necessarily mean unwanted. When we look at those
unintended pregnancies, the majority of women who become pregnant,
albeit unintended. will continue their pregnancies. Forty-eight percent of
those unintended pregnancies will end in abortion. When we convert that
to a rate, over time you can see that there has been a constant fall in the
number of abortions. Everybody wants to take credit for that, from people
who talk about abstinence-only education to people who create more
effective means of contraception. Whatever the reason the rate is falling,
we will take it.
Data examined in the aggregate does not always tell the whole story.
You can look at unintended pregnancy as a proxy for the likelihood of
a woman to continue to consider discontinuing her pregnancy. While
unintended prcgnancy rates haxve either stagnated or fallen xwhen thc data
is disaggregated and unintendcd pregnancy ratcs arc cxplored by xvarious
pcrimcters, one finds that in some sectors of the population unintended
pregnancy has increased. This is exvident particularly amongst poor wxomen.
wh ile it has decreased amongst wxomen wxith a higher income. WXhile there
has been a small decrease for wxomen ot means there has been larger
increase tor xxomen xvith limited iesouices. It has shifted the dilemma
ot pregnancy decision-making to xxomen wxho are more likely to haxve
adverse circ umstances affecting their reasoning. Women who experience
unintended pregnancy are disproportionately poor. While sixteen percent
women are poor., they account for thirty percent of unplanned pregnancies,
a disproportionate share.
Now to introduce a different frame, that is that being in poverty and being a
person of color is oftentimes synonymous, it is not always the same. When
considering women of African-Americain descent, they account for twenty-
six percent of the unintended pregnancies, while they make up fourteen
percent of the population. A similar trend is true for Ilispanic women.
Again, lispanic women represent a disproportionate share of unintended
pregnancies compared to their portion of the population.
Unintended pregnancy is a proxy for the likelihood of a woman choosing to
discontinue her pregnancy, but that does not necessarily mean an abortion,
as we saw that in the majority of unintended pregnancies women continue
their pregnancy. If we were to convert that disproportionate representation
in poverty to a rate, it makes sense that when you look at women below the
level of poverty, they haxve the highest rate of abortion. Because they have
the highest rate of unintended pregnancy, they are more likely to be in a
circumstance that will prompt them to consider abortion.
African-American women have the highest rate of abortion, followed by
Latino women. Women of color represent the highest rate of abortion,
which is counterintuitive when often times in the media the feminist
movement has been perceived to be largely for white women. In reality,
the notion that feminism empowers white women to have abortions would
fly in the face of their numbers. It is amazing how forces that are against
a woman's right to choose will spin this to say now we are talking about
eugenic and genocidal notions in terms of who has abortions.
What prompts the rates that I have shown you? Ihere has been some
survey research of women who recently had abortions. When asked about
the reasons why they chose to discontinue their pregnancies, most women
gave multiple reasons. Ihe average woman would give about five reasons
why she chose to terminate her pregnancy. The majority of those reasons
are related to the responsibilities that many women face by continuing a
pregnancy that they materially, socially, and otherwise cannot aflord.
Most women have reasons that are related to their social economic status,
trending towards the conclusion that women who rely on public assistance
are affected in an adverse way by the Medicaid policies that restrict their
access.
If you look at the reasons why a woman would delay having an abortion
to a later gestational age in pregnancy. aside from not realizing that she is
piegnant, the major reason is die diffhculty aiianging logistics, wxhich is
often a financial burden. NYon can nowx undcrstand xxhy xvomen rcly ing on
public assistance wxho cannot access funding tor abortion serxvices delax the
procedure. The rclatixve safety of abortion is linked to the procedure occurring
in the safest timctrame xxhere there are lcast likely to bc complications. If
you look oxver time, exven a xxeek's increase in thc gestational agc Inakes a
big difference in the risk for mortality and morbidity.
If you look at the number of deaths per 100,000 lixe births, death in the
context of pregnancy, whether you're talking about abortion or childbirth.
is a very rare thing. When it does occur, if you look at women who continue
their pregnancy to term, their risk for death is roughly ten times more if you
continue your pregnancy to term rather than iflyou have an abortion at any
point. I am not advocating for a woman to discontinue a pregnancy, but it
is to say that when women are forced to delay their decision-making for
whatever reason., they exponentially or at least significantly increase their
risk for morbidity and mortality, as demonstrated in published research by
my friend at CDC, Dr. Linda Bartlett. She showed that when you delay the
decision to have an abortion by even a week, you significantly increase a
woman's risk. Hence, policies that selectively disadvantage some women
over others devalue the lives of women who rely on public assistance,
thereby by forcing them to take unnecessary risks when seeking abortions.
I have been able to see the implications of such policies first-hand over the
last few years as an abortion provider. I want to present three cases that I
have managed in the last year and give you the fact patterns. They are all
three women of different backgrounds with different medical problems,
but what they have in common is that they all rely on Medicaid funding
for their health care. I will talk about these facts to give some texture to the
complexity of abortion decision making and explain why we sought to have
these women covered by Medicaid to have their procedure. I will also tell
you the outcome of the coverage determination.
The first case was a twx entx-five year old African American woman who
had AIDS. She was in renal failure and on dialysis three times a week.
She found that she was twelve weeks pregnant. The common medical
wisdom is that she probably would not survive a pregnancy if she chose
to continue. Initially. she made the decision to discontinue the pregnancy.
IThen she became conflicted and decided not to discontinue - but then
ultimately decided that she wanted to be around for as long as she could to
raise the two children that she already had. We approached Medicaid for
permission to provide the services. Under the lyde Amendment, as lisa
shared with you, there are three circumstances under which women can
access Medicaid coverage for abortion services. The the people evaluating
the case decided that the condition was life threatening to the mother and as
a result, they authorized coverage for the procedure.
The next case was a thirty year old Ilispanic woman who had one child and
was nine weeks pregnant because her birth control method failed. laving
an underlying condition that increased her risk for blood clots, she could
not take birth control pills. She had not yet heard about the IUD, although
she had by the time she met me. She also had a seizure disorder. In the
management of her blood clotting condition and her seizure disorder, she
was also on two medicines that were known to be teratogenic or had a high
likelihood of causing birth defects. Now, the pregnancy would also increase
hcr risk for hasing another blood clot that could go to her lungs and kill
her. Whcn xxe presentcd this case to Mcdicaid and thcy detennincd that
although her story xwas xery compelling there vsas no immediate, absolute
threat to the life of the mother. There 55as no doc umented abnormiality of
the pregnancy ev en though she sxas on twvo medications that had a v ery
high likelihood of causing birth defects. In that case. the procedure wsas not
authorized and Medicaid ietused to pay foi hei care.
IThe third case was a twenty-seven year old young Caucasian woman who
had two kids, was 13 weeks pregnant, and was hospitalized because the
heart valve that she had replaced began to leak, causing chest pain. She
thought that she might be pregnant and was also on the blood thinner that
was a known teratogen. She also had cocaine and alcohol binges, creating
multiple teratogenic exposures. She also had a heart condition that would
probably worsen with the progress of her pregnancy. We painted this
medical picture for Medicaid and again the deternination was that there
was no immediate, absolute threat to the life of the mother or the fetus and
the procedure was not authorized.
Now when I say that the procedure was not authorized, it does not mean
that the care was not provided. It just means that we could not get the
preauthorization to pay for the care that the woman needed. As a provider,
when I have a woman who has need, my medical reasoning and decision-
making should not be effected by the woman's ability to pay. On a daily
basis, I try to make sure that it is not.
When a patient is faced with the dilemma of whether to sign a promissory
note that might be demanded of her by an institution saying if we let you
have this care you have to agree that you are going to pay this money, for
some it becomes cheaper to continue the pregnancy than to figure out where
they are going to get the resources. It becomes quite clear how Medicaid
polic with regard to the Hyde Amendment effects and compromises the
care and .well-being of women and my ability to provide the best care that
I can as a provider.
It does so in a couple ofxways. It imposes a financial barrier to health care that
women would otherwise be entitled to as a part of their medical coverage,
creating hardship. It also creates health disparities by imposing financial
barriers that lead to differences in morbidity and mortality risks between
groups on the basis of race and socioeconomic status. In other words, poor
women have limited access to services. As I said earlier, poverty, race, and
ethnicity are not always synonymous. Any thing that delays the decision-
making process results in women having to take increased and absolute
risks with their lives.
Female Participant:
Ilow long does it take to get a preauthorization?
Dr. William Parker:
Actually they try to do so in an expeditious manner. Usually because the
answer is no, it does not take long, sometimes forty-eight hours. Most of
the time, once y ou get someone to take the information, they wxill pledge a
decision in twxenty -f our to forts-eight hours. \We usually try to help navigate
the maze f or them. Most people do not know wxhere to go or wxho to call.
They do not usually hasve the numbers oi the kimnd of diagnostic codcs and all
the other things that aire required. Thcre seems to be an air of wxhimsicality
in the dccision nmaking. That is my assessment. They find wxay s to deny the
most compelling cases and then cov er things I xxould not expect.
Jill Morrison*:
Thank you for having me here. My purpose is to put to rest any doubts that
the public scrutiny, the debate. the controversy, and the state intervention
in pregnant women's lives is over once she decides whether to have a baby.
There have been numerous efforts to intervene in the lives of pregnant
women. The most obvious example is efforts to prosecute pregnant women
based solely on their drug use during pregnancy. At the National Women's
Law Center (NWLC), where I work, we oppose such prosecutions. They
are bad public health policy because they discourage pregnant women
from seeking prenatal care and they violate the Constitution on several
grounds. Our work on that issue relates closely to what I will discuss today,
the prosecution of women for their birthing decisions and other actions
during pregnancy. I decided not to focus on addiction because addiction is
not a choice. It did not fit within the title "W hen a f onian s (hoice is Not
a (Choice," but as you can see, the issues are similar.
Because drug users are so stigmatized, it is sometimes difficult to have
empathy for them as women who are equally deserving of reproductive
justice. The cases I amx going to discuss are far more empathetic. At the
same time they expose and support the exact same misconceptions and
arguments that we use to oppose punitive measures against pregnant
addicts. We cite these same cases when we submit amicus briefs to courts
explaining why prosecuting pregnant women for child abuse, child neglect,
or homicide is rooted in sex discrimination. I am Ihappy to report that every
court to consider the issue has agreed that criminal laws were not intended
to be used in this manner.
The question at issue is the same for cases involving both drug use and
medical decision-making during pregnancy. Once pregnant, what is a
woman's duty to ensure the best possible health outcome for her unborn
child? What actions can be taken against her by a third party who believes
that she is not acting in the best interest of her fetus? What are your rights
when it comes to making medical decisions for yourself presuming that you
are not pregnant? \Nell here are the principles that apply, presuming you are
in support of Constitutional rights.
First I will talk about your rights regarding the acceptance and refusal of
medical care. In M1cTall x' Shimp, a man refused to donate blood marrow
to his cousin. le happened to be the only match for that cousin. So what
was the outcome? The court decided he did not have to donate. Why? le
has a right to bodily integrity. Ihere is no right to receive a donation of
bodily fluids, organs, or anything else from another person. (ruzan held
that competent adults have a iight to ietuse medical care even if it results
in their oxwn death. These are core principles protecting bodils integrity
and autonomys. Yet xwe hav crnans examples of attempts to xviolate these
principles xxheire pregnant wvonxen are concerned.
To begin, there are cases involving women's refusals to subnit to Caesarian
sections. In the leading case, I Re A.C, Angela Carder struggled with
cancer since the age of thirteen, but decided to get married and have a baby
after going into remission. T he cancer returned in the twenty-fifth week of
her pregnancy and she lapsed into a coma. The hospital, George Washington
University lospital in 'Aashington, D.C. was especially concerned about
her declining condition given the fact that the fletus was viable. The hospital
petitioned the court for an order to force Ms. Carter to have a Caesarian
section despite the opposition of her husband and family. The court ordered
the surger. Ms. Carter's treating doctors refused to perform the surgery
because they were aware of her wishes. A staff obstetrician grudgingly
agreed to perform the surgery. In the meantime, Ms. Carter came out of the
coma and was told about the planned surgery. When told she might die as
a result, she said over and over again that she did not want it done. Despite
this, a panel of the appeals court met and quickly upheld the lower court's
decision. Ihey performed a cesarean operation on her that she expressly did
not want. Ihe baby died within two hours of delivery. Angela Carter lasted
another two days. Ihere is no doubt whatsoever that the surgery hastened
her death.
Her family requested a hearing from the court of appeals trying to make
sure that no woman ever again was subjected to such treatment. The full
D.C. Court of Appeals reversed the panel's decision. IThe court reviewed
the other decisions that had refused to require organ donations between
relatives and concluded a fetus cannot have rights in this respect superior to
those of a person who has already been boin.
Since that case, virtually every court has supported a pregnant woman's
right to make medical decisions that may endanger the fetus or a pregnant
wonan's right to refuse treatment for the fetus' benefit. Ihe case In Re
Baby Boy Doe was technically rendered moot before the court could hear it
because the nother had a vaginal birth, but the court heard the case anyway
because it was apparent that this situation could arise again. In that case,
the state claimed that the lower court was correct in ordering a woman
to have a Caesarian section after balancing the state's interest in fetal life
against the right of a pregnant woman to choose her own medical care.
The appeals court rejected this argument finding that a woman's competent
choice to refuse medical treatment as invasive as a Caesarian section must
be honored even in circumstances where the choice may be harmful to her
fetus.
One reported case to the contrary graphically illustrates the incredible
violation of liberty and autonomy that occurs when the government
oxversteps its bounds. Laura Pemberton had prev iously had a Caesarian
section, but wxanted to give birth svaginally during her next pregnancs. This
sittiation is called a VBAC, and mans hospitals and doctors refuse to do
them, claiming that they put wxomxen at risk of uterine rupture. Pembherton's
doctor refused to attenxpt such a dclixvery and Pcnxbcrton decided to oivec
birth at honxe. During her honxe birth, she became deby drated and decided
to o to the hospital for IV fluids. The attending physician at the hospital
refused to givec her IV fluids and instead called the hospital administration.
Thbe administration then called its lawsyer, whbo tlxen called tlxe state's
attorney. In the nxeantiime 1Laura Penxberton, vshlo wxas tull term aixd in labor,
'slipped' out of the hospital. What followed was an almost unbelievable
scene. A woman in labor is taken from her home to the hospital by law
enforcement to submit to a court-ordered Caesarian section.
Ms. Pemberton sued, alleging a violation of her rights to bodily integrity
and to refuse medical treatment. She lost, ironically enough, based on the
court's application of Roe vT fde. The court focused solely on the part of
Roe v. Itaode that says that the state has an interest in a viable fetus. Ihe court
concluded that because the state has an interest in a viable fetus, it could
properly express that interest by ordering the Caesarian section to save the
fetus's life. Of course, it is impossible to know whether Ms. Pemberton
could have had a healthy delivery without the Caesarian section, but the
evidence is certainly in her favor. Ms. Pemberton went on to deliver four
children vaginally including a set of twins. So doctors don't always know
best.
The case of Melissa Ann Rowland shows that the state is willing to go
beyond mere aggressive intervention to criminal prosecution. Ms. Rowland
was threatened .with a homicide charge for not having a Caesarian section.
Eventually the prosecutor dropped the charges, claiming that he did so only
because Rowland was mentally ill.
Currently, a New Jersey Appeals Court is considering whether the state
can base a child neglect proceeding solely on a pregnant woman's refusal
to give advanced consent to a Caesarian section just in case any problems
arose during delivery. Keep in mind that there was no indication that the
woman would actually need a Caesarian section. As she went into labor,
the hospital handed her a bunch of papers and she chose not to sign the one
that says I will have a Caesarian section if it is needed. The state moved to
terminate her parental rights alleging neglect. The state also moved against
her husband because he agreed with her decision to withhold consent.
It is notjust refusals to have Caesarian sections that evoke state intervention
and criminal charges against pregnant women. 1ere are a few other
cases that involve a pregnant woman's right to refuse medical care. In In
Re CM., the New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services filed a
negligence complaint against an HIV positive woman because she refused
to take medication during her pregnancy that would reduce the risk of her
fetus being born with HIV. The court rejected the allegation of negligence
stating that a pregnant woman's decision to refuse medical treatment that
would benefit her fetus is a part of her constitutionally protected right to
privacy. In 7ft v lhft, the Massachusetts Supreme Court vacated a lower
court decision ordering Mrs. Taft to have her cervix sewn to prevent a
possible miscarriage. She had a weak cervix and there is a surgery that can
be done called a 'purse string' suigery. She dlid not xwant to have it. but Mr.
Taft asked for a court oider. The court refused to oider the surgerx.
U nfortunately, as y ou can see from these cases, often xxomen are foreed to
v indieate their rights only after their rights hav e been v iolated. So they are
doing so on behalf ot others xwho may be in similar circunxstances in the
future. IThis raises the question of boyw many other wvomen are subjected
to such treatment and simply do not haxve the resources, the energy, the
wxheiewxithal. or the motiv ation to fid an attorney and try to remedy the
iights of otheis, especially considering that these wxomen have a nevvborn
baby at home. For eveix one ot these cases that occurs that actually comes
to court, just think of how many others are out there.
Why does this keep happening? These principles about bodily integrity and
autonomy are deeply engrained in our constitutional jurisprudence. So why
are states, prosecutors, and hospital adninistrators not getting the message?
The -United States Supreme Court once upheld a statute limiting women,
but not men, to ten hour work days. According to the Court, the state
presented adequate justification for the infringement on women's liberty
because "healthy mothers are essential to vigorous offspring, the physical
well being of women becomes an object of public interest and care in order
to preserve the strength and vigor of the race."
If you have ever been visibly pregnant at any point in your life you are
acutely aware of the public interest in pregnant women. When you are
visibly pregnant, some people seem to think that you are public property.
People believe they can touch you, they can give you advice, and tell
you what to do and more importantly, what not to do. This is the interest
that these state actions are actually reflecting. This is why those who are
expected to uphold the law, prosecutors and other state officials, initiate
prosecutions that they know are unconstitutional. This is why those who
are best versed on principles of infonned consent, doctors and hospital
administrators, enthusiastically violate these principles when it comes to
pregnant women.
Underlying these infringements on pregnant women's liberty is the
discriminatory notion that women's best and perhaps only contribution
to society is her fulfillment of her reproductive role. Women are expected
to be self-sacrificing and altruistic, to submit their very lives for the sake
of their children. A 'real' mother would not even want to assert the same
liberty and autonomy rights as other individuals. Again, if this is something
that you think is untrue or an overstatement, I would have to ask why ,we
keep seeing these cases over and over again.
Regarding the Hyde Amendment, I was very interested Doctor in what
you were saying about how arbitrarily these decisions are made. I was
wondering if politically it would be more palatable to revise the regulations
to broaden the medical bases for which what you call life endangerment
as opposed to overturning the Hyde Amendment. And to Lisa, whether
or not that would be possible. Although the movement has talked about
overturning IHyde, I am so not optimistic about that. I know regulations are
a lot easier to change than laws.
Dr. William Parker:
I think from a medical standpoint, the notion of what is considered an
absolute versus a relative indication is important. It is almost like with
medical expeitise, you knovx the plan is fine. I think the 1Hyde Amendment
has its greatest impact in teims of the vvay it introduces administratixe
dela. If yo 0c reate a process that is evena ixoire nuanced, it still does not
get around the notion that people bring the values to the deeision making
process that they bring. If I thought that refining the process xxould make a
difference, t vvould be an adxvocate for that. At the cad of the day whbat t find
is that it xxill never trump the Inoral context in xwhich nxaxy people process
abortion care.
Lisa Browvn:
I definitely agree with that in terms of the states that require Medicaid to
fund all or most mxedically necessary abortions. They have found other
wayxs to make it difficult. Although it is not as difficult and you have more
likelihood of having your abortion funded in one of those states than in a
Hyde only state. we have providers in one state who all work together and
all have found that they have completely different experiences with the
Medicaid office depending on who they talk to, how big their clinic is, and
how they interact with the Medicaid office on family planning and other
issues besides just abortion.
If they already have a relationship with the Medicaid office, and the
Medicaid office funds other procedures for them, then they are more
likely to get their abortion procedures funded. Even then, the Medicaid
office routinely loses their paperwork. There is a clinic in another state
that actually physically goes to the Medicaid office and hands in their
paperwork because it has gotten lost so much of the time.
Female Participant:
I have a question for Miss Morrison. Have you seen cases of women
wanting to do home birth as opposed to delivering in the hospital? lave
you ever seen litigation forcing a woman to go to a hospital on the day of
deliv ery?
Jill Morrison:
I have not seen it litigated yet, but given the clash between some medical
authorities and midwives in some states, I really do think it is just a matter
of time. \\e are going to get to the point where doing anything against
your doctor's advice can be a cause to bring child neglect or criminal
proceedings against you.
Dr. William Parker:
One of the things that I have seen is the introduction of the notion of
vicarious liability breeding contempt between midwives and obstetricians
such that there are barriers to women if they make the decision for a home
birth or if they make a decision to have their care with a midwife that
decision becomes binding and absolute. It puts them on a path where, in
some ways, they have restricted access to the interventional care that they
can obtain with an obstetrician.
We had a forum in Calilornia where we sought to explore to what degree
the statutory and regulatory mechanism of the state could intercede
between insurance companies breeding these contemptuous relationships
that ultimately penalize women. Basically what you are saying is if you
want to have a certain type of birth experience and you make that decision,
you are locked out of the health care system where we could optimize your
outcome by creating this defensive posture for obstetricians. If I am haxving
a conversation with Miss Morrison and she is a midwife and she says I
have this patient who has a high blood pressure, what do you think I ought
to do? If she mentions that we had a conversation, the concept of vicarious
liability says that I am liable even though I've never met this patient. As a
person who's practicing defensively, I say oops, I cannot talk to you. At the
end of the day it is the woman who is in her care that pay s.
